familiar, for example, that we might not be able to tell the difference between A and Band, consequently perceive them as equal, similarly with respect to Band C, but be able to tell the difference between A and C, because there is a just noticeable difference between A and C, and, consequently, perceive A as greater than C. This failure of transitivity generates conflict if we believe that equality is transitive. We must evaluate the first order beliefs that generate the conflict in order to resolve it. The limits of discrimination produce a conflict among desires when we desire more rather than less of the perceived quality, for then we shall desire A and B equally, desire Band C equally, but desire A over C. The conflict arises when we wish to use our desires as the basis for pairwise choice among alternatives and avoid the choice of C when A is available. Again failure of transitivity generates conflict.
These examples of conflict arising in our beliefs and desires ilIustrate the inevitability of conflict among our beliefs and desires as weH as the structure of conflict resolution. First we must have some representation, conception or description of our first order states. Otherwise we would be blind to the existence of the conflict and immobilized by it. This representation of lower level states is, I aver, a product of consciousness. It is possible for a being who is not conscious to have higher order representations of first order states, computers are such beings, but we obtain representations of first order states, of the equalities and inequalities mentioned in the examples, from our conscious awareness of them. The first step in conflict resolutions is, therefore, metamental representation of the conflict itself. The second is the proliferation of alternative solutions. The third is the metamental evaluation of the states generating the conflict and the exercise of autonomy to resolve the conflict. Resolution of the confict, as opposed to acceptance of it, requires rejection of one or more of the first order states.} Though the need for metamental ascent is forced in case of conflict, I think that metamental evaluation of first order states of belief and desire is robust if not ubiquitous in our mentality. Of course, most metamental evaluation is nonreflective and proceeds
